The power of moral skepticism

The false dualisms seem to arise a lot these days, as a feature of the way advanced Western culture tries to process morality (and quite clearly in the absence of historical theory, or something that could lend substantiality, like sociological analysis). One ends up processing all of reality as different (but somehow all too similar) abstractions. One abstraction becomes easily interchangeable with another -- for they are both ungrounded abstractions.

Having demonstrated their interchangeability with each other, the contemporary moralist can then congratulate himself: "See!" he cries. "Action, as such, is dubious."

I am all too aware of the kind of "argument" that follows Echidne's critique here:

First, many of us have been neither geese nor ganders but perhaps ducks or gulls, some species of birds which was not inappropriately generalizing in the first place, in either direction. Saletan confuses the issue by ignoring that, preferring a plunge into false dualism.

This false dualism -- which ultimately turns out not to be so much of a dualism, after all, but a monism, as it makes everyone out to be the same -- is linked to a form of moral skepticism.

Moral skepticism (with its attendant clause, "deep down we are all the same") seems to have it origination in the idea of original sin -- that whatever we do, we will be wrong, so why try to do anything right?

Those who would maintain power over others (but with a bad conscience) have every reason for embracing moral skepticism. Think about those groups that are intent upon justifying patriarchy, for instance.

Such groups tend to cling onto the argument which has the structure: "We are all sinners anyway! So, you'd better do exactly as I say!"